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1 **Abstract**

2 Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly-contagious livestock disease with global
3 socioeconomic ramifications. The disease negatively impacts both individual farmers through
4 reduced herd viability and nations through trade restrictions of animals and animal derivatives.
5 Vaccines for FMD prevention have existed for over 70 years, yet the disease remains enzootic in
6 a large percentage of the globe. FMD persistence is due in part to technical limitations of historic
7 and current vaccine technologies. There also exist many socioeconomic and political barriers to
8 global FMD eradication. Here we highlight the barriers to eradication and discuss potential
9 avenues towards FMD eradication.

10

1 Introduction

2 Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting both
3 domesticated and wild cloven-hoofed animals worldwide [1-3]. The disease has global
4 ramifications, costing an estimated \$6 to \$21 billion USD each year in prevention expenditure
5 and agricultural damage [4]. The significant portion of this cost is shouldered by the world's
6 poorest countries, who are financially unable to proactively protect themselves against the virus
7 and are therefore subject to uncontrolled outbreaks [5]. Further compounding the issue, many
8 countries experience additional economic loss from trade restrictions imposed by the World
9 Organization for Animal Health (*Office International des Epizooties* or OIE)[6]. In addition,
10 FMD-free countries are under constant threat of infection and must actively prevent introduction
11 of FMD. The worldwide negative economic impact of FMD drive the desire for global
12 eradication of the disease [1].

13 As mentioned above, the interest in potential eradication of FMD is not limited to
14 countries who suffer frequent outbreaks of the disease. The ease of transmission leaves FMD-
15 free countries with the perpetual risk of accidental or deliberate infection of their respective
16 herds with potentially devastating effects to agriculture. For example, in 1997, Taiwan had been
17 considered FMD-free for 68 years when an outbreak arose and quickly spread to virtually the
18 entire nation [7]. This forced the introduction of a vaccination program, which resulted in
19 international trade restrictions and generally devastated Taiwan's pork industry [8].

20 Divergent opinions are held around the world as to how FMD outbreak and prevention
21 should be approached due to the social, economic and political ramifications of the disease. This
22 compounds the complexity of an already difficult problem and these complications must be
23 considered when pursuing global scale eradication [9, 10].

1 Many excellent articles have discussed the nature of the FMD virus (FMDV) [11, 12] and
2 limitations of FMD vaccine technologies [3, 13, 14]. Here we highlight the technical and
3 political challenges of FMD eradication and how these challenges exacerbate one another.
4 Finally, we consider approaches for methodical global eradication that will potentially satisfy the
5 technical, social, economic and political challenges surrounding FMD.

1 **FMD Virus and Related Challenges**

2 Foot-and-mouth disease virus belongs to the family picornaviridae – small, non-
3 enveloped viruses with a single positive-sense RNA molecule. The viral genome encodes for 4
4 structural proteins (VP1, VP2, VP3, and VP4) and several non-structural proteins that play roles
5 in virus replication, assembly of the virus particle, and control of the host innate and adaptive
6 immune response [2]. FMDV is genetically diverse, with seven distinct serotypes: type O, A, C,
7 SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3, and Asia 1 [15]. Furthermore, subtypes within each serotype contain a
8 large spectrum of genetic diversity due to high mutation rates during genome replication and
9 many of these mutations can be accommodated while maintaining virulence [16]. The broad
10 genetic diversity between and within serotypes complicates identifying and protecting against
11 disease [17]. Specifically, the variability in the antigenic regions can reduce or effectively
12 eliminate cross-subtype or -serotype protection from previous infection or vaccination as
13 occurred in Iran in 2005 [18].

14

15 **Disease Traits and Related Challenges**

16 In addition to the significant genetic diversity of the virus, FMDV infects diverse hosts,
17 affecting over 70 species of wild and domestic cloven-hoofed species such as cattle, sheep and
18 swine [2]. The variety of hosts and diversity of serotypes synergistically complicates disease
19 prevention. Furthermore, signs and disease severity may significantly differ from species to
20 species. Generally, cattle have obvious oral and pedal lesions, while swine primarily have pedal
21 lesions [19]. Sheep show milder signs - 25% of infected sheep develop no lesions and a further
22 25% develop only one lesion - making visible diagnosis difficult or impossible [20]. In addition
23 a number of other viral diseases including vesicular stomatitis, swine vesicular disease, and

1 vesicular exanthema of swine cause disease signs similar to FMD [2]. Incubation periods from
2 exposure to first signs vary by initial infection dose, route of transmission, and animal species
3 ranging from as little as 1 day to up to 14 days [1]. Therefore, some animals may remain
4 asymptomatic and act as carriers of the virus while others are misdiagnosed [21]. Such cases
5 increase the possibility of accidental transmission from primary or secondary contact between
6 herds.

7 The ability of the virus to infect cross-species through sundry routes increases
8 transmission opportunities, particularly where livestock agriculture is densely populated [22].
9 Cattle and sheep are primarily infected through respiration of the virus in aerosol form, while
10 swine are more likely to be infected through ingestion or subcutaneous wounds [1]. Shedding of
11 the virus may occur through multiple routes including in aerosol form, urine, feces, and bodily
12 fluids [23]. Excreted virus can retain infectivity for significant durations in aerosol form, with
13 examples of some strains naturally traveling as far as 300 km [1]. The extent of FMD
14 transmission can be further amplified by incidental transport on vehicles, humans, water, and
15 animal products [1, 24]. The diverse routes of shedding and transmission coupled with the
16 diversity of host species provide myriad opportunities for spread of the disease.

17 In certain hosts, including cattle and buffalo, the virus can persist and these
18 asymptomatic, persistently infected animals can remain potentially contagious for up to 5 years
19 [17, 21]. Infected animals are thought to reach a maximum transmission potential within 12 days
20 of infection [25]. In a dead host, the virus may remain stable, and persist in an infectious form
21 for as long as 11 days in muscle tissue, and 4 months in the liver [24]. Also, infectious virus can
22 persist within many other animal products such as milk and cheese for differing durations [24].
23 Some experts suspect that the longevity of the virus in animal products is what led to the 2001

1 outbreak in the UK. The outbreak is thought to have started when a farmer purportedly fed his
2 animals FMDV-contaminated imported food scraps, which were insufficiently heat treated to
3 remove the possibility of infection [26].

4 The complexities of this highly infectious and persistent disease complicate strategies of
5 eradication. Although an inactivated FMD-vaccine was developed and successfully used on large
6 numbers of animals in the 1950's, FMD is still prolifically spread through the world [27, 28].
7 Below, we will discuss the attributes of the predominant vaccine technology and the economic,
8 social and political barriers that have hindered global eradication to this point.

9

10 **Predominant Vaccine Technology**

11 The predominately utilized FMD vaccine is based on inactivated FMDV [29]. This
12 vaccine is typically produced from live FMDV amplified in baby hamster kidney-21 cells,
13 chemically inactivated, partially purified by some manufacturer's, and subsequently formulated
14 with an adjuvant [3]. Throughout the process, a sterile environment and meticulous management
15 of temperature and pH is essential to ensure production of an effective, noninfectious vaccine
16 [30]. This vaccine technology comes with the inherent risk of live virus release from production
17 facilities or insufficient inactivation of the virus during vaccine preparation [3]. Indeed, it is
18 thought that the 2005 FMD outbreak in China initiated when insufficiently inactivated virus was
19 used to vaccinate, resulting in an outbreak that spread throughout China and into Russia and
20 Mongolia [18]. In addition, the 2007 outbreak in the UK was caused by inadvertent release of
21 virus from the Pirbright vaccine and research institute [23].

22 The risk of virulent virus contamination or insufficient inactivation during vaccine
23 production requires that production facilities maintain rigorous biosafety standards. This restricts

1 the locations where production facilities can be successfully constructed, maintained, and
2 operated. Furthermore, these facilities must operate at a high level of containment. The distance
3 between production facilities and regions of FMD infections presents a logistical challenge of
4 distribution, particularly where international borders are concerned. To help alleviate this
5 challenge, in some parts of the world FMD vaccine banks have been established to increase
6 vaccine accessibility [31, 32].

7 FMD vaccine banks decide how much vaccine they will store for any given serotype, and
8 regularly test these stored vaccines for efficacy [33, 34]. These tests are essential as a concern
9 with the current technology for inactivated virus vaccine production is the possible selection of
10 antigenic variants during virus replication [35, 36]. It has been found that the selected variants
11 for vaccines may not always be protective against current virus strains circulating in the field. In
12 addition, the choice of which vaccines to store is complicated by limited cross-subtype and
13 cross-serotype protection, requiring individual vaccines against each subtype that is currently
14 circulating for effective protection [33, 37]. Vaccines must also be periodically replaced due to a
15 shelf life of 1-2 years for conventional FMD vaccines [17]. Storage of vaccines as concentrated
16 antigens in liquid nitrogen improves shelf life [38]. However, these concentrated antigens must
17 be shipped to manufacturers for formulation with an adjuvant when needed, thus delaying their
18 use in the field.

19 Administration of the vaccine also presents its own set of complexities such as proper
20 handling, correct dosage, and optimal time of vaccination. All of these variables can significantly
21 impact the efficacy of the vaccine [3, 39]. For example, a higher dosage of vaccine generally
22 results in increased number of animals protected and reduces the time from administration to
23 protection [3]. As a consequence, during outbreaks in previously disease-free countries,

1 emergency vaccination of animals with 6 protective dose 50 (PD50) is recommended by the OIE.
2 Complexities of administration make it desirable for trained persons to administer the vaccine.
3 Also, persons administering vaccines to multiple herds may inadvertently act as disease carriers
4 [40]. Furthermore, regions with inadequate veterinary services face the added challenge of
5 increasing competency among those administering vaccination [41].

6 Other vaccine technologies are becoming available that are attempting to address the
7 shortcomings of inactivated virus vaccines discussed above. These include empty capsid
8 vaccines, DNA vaccines, recombinant protein vaccines and peptide vaccines, among others [13,
9 29, 39, 42, 43]. An example of a novel vaccine technology is the recent development of a
10 replication-defective human adenovirus vector containing the FMDV capsid protein coding
11 region for serotype A24 Cruzeiro [44]. This vaccine has been granted a conditional license by the
12 Center for Veterinary Biologics, Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service, USDA. This
13 license allows the vaccine to be included in the U.S. National Veterinary Vaccine Stockpile to be
14 used in cattle in the event of an emergency situation [45]. Recent reviews have described the
15 benefits and limitations of this and other novel vaccine technologies [29, 43, 46].

16 Vaccine production technologies must also become more efficient and economical, as is
17 being pursued with emerging technologies involving production of virus-like particle FMD
18 vaccines produced in *E. coli*, in insect cells infected with recombinant baculoviruses, and in cell-
19 free systems [2, 3, 47, 48]. To be successful for eradication, vaccine technologies and systems
20 must avoid the pitfalls of inactivated viruses and be sufficiently inexpensive as to be
21 economically viable for developing countries.

22

23 **Economic Considerations for FMD-Free Regions**

1 One concern with the use of inactivated-virus vaccines is the inability to differentiate
2 infected animals from vaccinated animals (DIVA) [3]. However, more recently some FMD
3 vaccine manufacturers have partially purified their vaccines thus presumably eliminating or
4 mitigating this problem. Nevertheless, as discussed below, FMD-free countries still have
5 generally resisted using vaccination to control the disease in the event of an outbreak. The OIE
6 classifies nations and regions as FMD-free without vaccination, FMD-free with vaccination,
7 Suspended with or without vaccination or Unrecognized (Figure 1) [49]. Typically, only regions
8 designated “FMD-free without vaccination” are unburdened by trade restrictions on animals and
9 animal products [18]. Although regions can achieve the status “FMD-free with vaccination,” the
10 lack of DIVA vaccines puts the true disease status of vaccinated animals into question and trade
11 restrictions remain imposed [3]. Such was the case in 1977 in Morocco when an outbreak
12 resulted from importation of “vaccinated” South American animals, costing an estimated \$3.3
13 million USD to eradicate [6].

14 The classifications established by the OIE and their ramifications on animal commerce
15 incentivize the use of preventative measures other than vaccination to avert outbreaks. Many
16 FMD-free regions rely on expensive preventative measures such as border control and animal
17 movement restrictions [50, 51]. Import restrictions on animals and animal products are also
18 employed [18]. While effective, there is still a risk of virus introduction due to illegal animal
19 movement as occurred in Chile in 1984 and 1987, causing outbreaks after disease status was
20 declared FMD-free in 1981 [52].

21 At times, the risk of outbreak overcomes the best prevention efforts. Once an outbreak is
22 confirmed, there are three primary courses of action that have been used by FMD-free countries

1 to prevent further spread of the disease: 1) isolate and vaccinate-to-live, 2) isolate, vaccinate, and
2 slaughter or 3) isolate and slaughter (Figure 2) [3].

3 For the isolate and vaccinate response policies, samples of virus are collected from
4 outbreak sites, analyzed to determine serotype and subtype, and then matched with vaccines
5 contained in storage to determine which will be most potent [3]. Once vaccinated, animals may
6 become immunologically protected from the disease within days or weeks, depending on the
7 vaccine's efficacy [53]. Delays in time-to-protection and the imposition of trade restrictions are
8 major reasons the vaccinate-to-live policy is problematic in regions previously free of the disease
9 and rarely employed. Therefore, most FMD-free countries have preferred the isolate and
10 slaughter policy or the isolate, vaccinate, and slaughter policy during outbreaks [7, 54, 55]. A
11 further impetus for FMD-free countries to utilize slaughter-based policies rather than vaccinate-
12 to-live is that the former policy allows countries to regain FMD free status more quickly
13 according to OIE guidelines.

14 When outbreaks occur in regions historically free of the disease, slaughtering is often
15 vigorously pursued to prevent further transmission [54-56]. Indeed, this approach tends to be
16 somewhat indiscriminate and many uninfected animals may be killed as a precaution [54]. The
17 2001 outbreak in Great Britain resulted in the slaughter of 4 million animals on over 10,000
18 farms [26]. Of those 10,000 farms, 8,000 of them contained animals that were only potentially
19 exposed to disease [26].

20 The disposal or destruction of slaughtered animals poses a significant logistical hurdle.
21 Due to the persistence of the virus even in dead tissue, carcasses must be disposed of in such
22 ways that prevent further transmission. This is typically accomplished by burial in a remote

1 location or burning. In either case, success of disposal is dependent on trained personnel and the
2 existence of sufficient facilities.

3 When facilities are unavailable to slaughter and dispose of large amounts of animals, a
4 policy of isolation, vaccinating and slaughtering can be employed. In the 2001 outbreak in the
5 Netherlands, this technique was used until animals were sufficiently protected by vaccination
6 and able to be transported to central culling facilities [54].

7 Destroying animals can be economically painful for individual farmers, unless they are
8 compensated for their loss. Incentivizing surveillance and reporting through compensation is
9 commonly used to make up for the loss but can also have unintended consequences. During the
10 1997 outbreak in Taiwan, the government was offering more than market price for infected
11 animals, purportedly incentivizing farmers to infect their own herds and increase marginal profits
12 [57, 58]. Therefore, incentives must be carefully crafted to avoid similar outcomes.

13

14 **Economic Considerations for FMD-Enzootic Regions**

15 Left untended, regions of disease outbreak could become FMD-enzootic regions. At such
16 a juncture, the method of slaughter and destroy used in FMD-free countries is not considered
17 economically feasible [59]. In places such as Mexico, sustained slaughter and burn eradication
18 techniques in 1947 quickly led to food shortages and general devastation of livestock agriculture
19 until a vaccination policy was implemented [56].

20 Quarantining infected animals is also difficult, as many of the FMD enzootic regions
21 have limited governmental infrastructure to impose a quarantine [60]. Even if a quarantine is
22 imposed, without thorough testing and surveillance at the end of the quarantine, FMD positive
23 animals can be released back into the population as occurred in Zimbabwe in 1987. Infected

1 cattle which had been quarantined for 6 months and then placed on another farm were the cause
2 of the 1989 Zimbabwe outbreak [61]. Also, many enzootic regions are rural in nature, increasing
3 the potential of wild-domestic herd interaction and transmission [22]. These interactions can
4 result in FMD persistence and spread, but the significance of such interactions on propagating
5 FMD is unclear [22][62].

6 If the rate of outbreaks exceeds 4 outbreaks every 10 years, prevention through
7 methodical vaccination becomes economically preferable to slaughter and more effective than
8 long term quarantine [6, 56]. Thus, vaccination is currently considered the most plausible plan
9 for FMD eradication in enzootic areas [59].

10 Although vaccines are currently available, they can be cost prohibitive and be limited in
11 availability for many enzootic regions [18]. In a cost-benefit summary of FMD eradication in
12 Sudan it was estimated that 81% of the eradication costs were attributed to purchasing the
13 vaccine [50]. The price of a current vaccine hinders economically developing countries from
14 disease eradication efforts because each vaccine cost between \$0.40 and \$3.00 USD to
15 manufacture and ship [4]. It is a challenge to reduce the cost of the traditional vaccine due to the
16 stringent conditions needed to prevent contamination or insufficient inactivation and costs
17 associated with testing, distribution, and storage. Future developments in vaccine technology
18 must consider cost when attempting to produce alternative candidates for developing countries.

19 Regions striving to obtain FMD-free status face the costs of vaccination as well as trade
20 restrictions and animal production losses [6]. These regions also shoulder similar burdens that
21 FMD-free regions face such as restricting imports and animal movement control in order to
22 prevent disease reintroduction from bordering countries [4]. Some nations may have the
23 resources to deal with these problems. However, many FMD enzootic nations are too

1 impoverished to take meaningful steps towards eradication and may need outside sources to fund
2 programs that overcome this challenge (Figure 3) [63]. Procuring initial funding for vaccine
3 based eradication through the World Bank has become increasingly more difficult due to policy
4 changes forcing developing countries to depend on other sources [59]. Even after initial aid is
5 secured and vaccinations are underway, the lack of continued economic support can result in
6 reemergence of the disease [60]. However, there are success stories where countries such as
7 Turkey, Georgia, and Armenia receive continued foreign financial support funding vaccination
8 due to their proximity to FMD-free European countries [18]. Although the disease is still present
9 in these countries, vaccination has reduced disease incidence within these countries [64]. Thus,
10 sustained financial investment from developed countries is perhaps the only way in which global
11 FMD eradication could occur.

12 Global FMD eradication would remove a primary barrier preventing global animal
13 commerce. Freedom from trade restrictions has the potential to improve national economies.
14 More importantly, livestock agriculture is considered a viable path from poverty and eradication
15 of FMD would help individuals rise out of poverty in developing countries [6, 59].

16

17 **Social and Political Challenges Surrounding Eradication**

18 Globalization of animal trade and animal product commerce further amplifies the
19 difficulty to contain FMD. Both legal and illegal animal trade and animal product commerce
20 have FMD outbreaks in the past. This was epitomized by outbreaks occurring in Albania in 1996
21 due to lax trade policy and outbreaks in the island nation of Taiwan in 1997 where the suspected
22 origin of the outbreak was illegally imported feed or pigs [2, 41]. Taiwan's and Albania's
23 outbreak, as well as other outbreaks, suggests that there is inadequate education on the threat of

1 disease transmission. The lack of education leads to ineffective FMD prevention and eradication
2 programs. Providing proper information regarding FMD transmission and convincing skeptical
3 populations to take proper precautions is no small task. This is especially challenging when a
4 short-term individual economic gain could be realized by ignoring proper precautions [65].

5 Lack of effective education, surveillance, and reporting programs have undermined
6 eradication and exacerbated outbreaks. In the 2001 UK outbreak, the farm where the outbreak
7 began failed to report the disease until 3 weeks post infection [26]. In this time, the diseased
8 animals were able to travel to FMD-free France, Netherlands and Ireland [54, 66, 67]. This
9 outbreak cost the UK an estimated \$9 billion USD [68]. Educating both local authorities and
10 local farmers on FMD could have mitigated the outbreak extent and cost.

11 To entice countries to work toward disease freedom, the OIE and the UN Food and
12 Agriculture Organization (FAO) will work with a given country to establish multiple zones with
13 separate FMD designations [69]. These zones allow countries to increase the export of animal
14 products from FMD-free regions of the country while working toward disease freedom in other
15 regions. Countries with multiple FMD designated regions include Argentina, Brazil, Peru and
16 the Philippines among others (Figure 1) [70].

17 In the past 6 years, the OIE and FAO have established a Progressive Control Pathway for
18 FMD eradication [71, 72]. This tool aims to aid entire regions in controlling and eradicating
19 FMD by providing clearly defined outcomes for each stage of control. The outcomes can be
20 achieved through a variety of means, allowing each country inside the control region discretion
21 to progress within the stages as they choose. The progressive control pathway has helped control
22 and combat multiple outbreaks [73]. However, individual countries must still sort out the
23 logistics of how outcomes are obtained.

1 India, one such country working toward disease freedom, faces many social challenges to
2 disease eradication. These challenges stem from lack of cooperation between officials and
3 livestock owners as well as a lack of cooperation between departments [74]. . This exemplifies
4 the necessity of cooperation within a country in order to achieve disease free status.

5 The lack of cross-governmental cooperation has also played a role in delaying eradication
6 efforts. The ease of transmission and variety of hosts promotes transmission across borders.
7 Therefore, the spread of an outbreak is better controlled when bordering countries communicate
8 and cooperate [75]. Failure of international cooperation can undermine eradication programs
9 through cross-border reintroduction of FMD. Cross-border spread of the disease is further
10 stimulated by burdensome trade restrictions imposed on countries who report FMD within their
11 borders. To avoid these trade restrictions, countries with outbreaks will delay reporting in order
12 to privately stamp it out and continue trade [41]. These delays in reporting increase the risk of
13 disease spread and transmission [76]. Although challenging, cross-governmental cooperation has
14 proven effective in the past resulting in eradication or minimizing FMD outbreaks in places such
15 as the US, Mexico Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, the UK, and parts of Asia [56, 77].

16 Proper education and cooperation between government and locals in Argentina provided
17 the foundation for a successful vaccine-based eradication program. Suffering from yearly
18 outbreaks of FMD since 1870, Argentina began the Argentine National FMD Control
19 Programme from 1990 to 1997 which resulted in over 85% of cattle being vaccinated, the disease
20 eradicated, and the designation of FMD-free without vaccination [78]. Due to bordering
21 countries maintaining disease status, Argentina currently has effectively partitioned off their
22 northern border with a disease status of free with vaccination, and their southern border as free
23 without vaccination, as seen in Figure 1 [49].

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Conclusion

The global eradication of FMD is fraught with many challenges. However, vaccine-based eradication has been demonstrated to be a feasible strategy regionally and could be expanded to global application. To do so, multiple significant challenges must be overcome. First, education and logistical organization must be arranged to properly incentivize and execute eradication measures. For example, developing countries have very little veterinary infrastructure and must rely on support from developed countries to establish a veterinary service system trained to recognize FMD signs and perform serosurveillance. Some of these measures are currently being pursued in Iraq and many other countries [63]. Second, development of effective surveillance methods such as on-site diagnostic tests available for use on animals crossing borders or within a country's borders could aid in the more rapid detection of FMD outbreaks [79]. Third, vaccines and vaccine production technology must be significantly less expensive while becoming more flexible for deployment of vaccines. Also, the development of safe vaccine technologies that remove the possibility of accidental outbreak and enable rapid differentiation between infected and vaccinated animals (DIVA) would simplify the eradication effort. Recent developments have begun to address some of these concerns, such as the replication deficient adenovirus-vectored FMD DNA vaccine and the *E. coli*-produced FMD-SUMO fusion vaccine [29, 80]. A subsidized coordinated global effort to methodically vaccinate with an effective and inexpensive vaccine appears to be one of the most viable pathways to global eradication of FMD.

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1 **Figure Captions**

2 **Figure 1: Worldwide FMD Status**

3 The FMD Status as defined by the OIE in November 2013. Recognized OIE status is dependent
4 on OIE membership. South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan are areas currently under
5 suspension. South America has large areas currently FMD-free with vaccination. Continued
6 vaccination programs have progressively stamped out the disease in the majority of South
7 America. FMD Status map used with permission courtesy of OIE and can be found online at
8 <http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/official-disease-status/fmd>.

9 **Figure 2: Response to FMD Outbreak and in FMD Enzootic Regions**

10 Possible response routes to an FMD outbreak in regions free of FMD and possible response
11 routes in regions enzootic with FMD. Response option limitations must be weighed against the
12 ultimate goal of FMD eradication.

13 **Figure 3: FMD Disease Cycle**

14 Many FMD enzootic countries are unable to economically afford the technology or the response
15 routes necessary to completely eradicate FMD, thus they remain trapped in a cycle of FMD
16 infection. If a response reaction and surveillance are not maintained, FMD will persist in those
17 countries.

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
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- 13

Figure 1

OIE Member Countries' official FMD status map



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Official FMD status of Member Countries - Whole country or zone(s)

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
|  Country/zone free without vaccination |  Suspension of the status free without vaccination |  Containment zone |
|  Country/zone free with vaccination |  Suspension of the status free with vaccination |  No recognised status |

Figure 2

Outbreak within an FMD-free Region

FMD Enzootic Region




Figure 3

